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THE U.S.-EU GMO DEBATE
I. INTRODUCTION
The emergence of trade barriers within multilateral trade agreements and
the potential conflict between those restrictions and the General Agreement on
Tariffs and Trade (GATT)1 have become central arguments in an ongoing
debate between those trying to uphold principles of unrestricted international
trade and those trying to prevent environmental harm. Trade barriers have
long been utilized by countries involved in international trade, primarily in an
effort to strong-arm environmental compliance.2 Although discriminatory
trade barriers may be justified under the environmental exceptions of GATT,3
those exceptions have historically been narrowly interpreted.4 With such a
strict standard imposed on restrictive trade measures, current members of the
World Trade Organization (WTO)5 have expressed both criticism and growing
concern regarding their inability to regulate international trade to protect
human health and the environment.
Recent advancements in biotechnology, including the creation of geneti-
cally modified foods, have caused the debate to expand. In response to the
placement of genetically modified food products into the international trade
arena, a large number of WTO members, including the member states of the
European Union (EU), have enacted trade regulations prohibiting or restricting
I General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade, Oct. 30, 1947,61 Stat. A-11, T.I.A.S. 1700,55
U.N.T.S. 194 [hereinafter GATI. As a result of the Uruguay Round of trade negotiations in
1994, the GATT organization became the World Trade Organization (WTO) on January 1, 1995.
General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade: Multilateral Trade Negotiations Final Act Embodying
the Results of the Uruguay Round of Multilateral Trade Negotiations, April 15, 1994, LEGAL
INSTRUMENTS-RESULTS OF THE URUGUAY RoUND, vol. 1 (1994), 33 I.L.M. 1125 (1994)
[hereinafter WTO Agreement]. WTO Agreement Annex IA incorporates a document labeled
GAIT 1994, which is essentially GATT 1947, as amended through Uruguay Round, along with
all the ancillary agreements pertaining to GAT' 1947, as modified.
2 Thomas J. Schoenbaum, Trade and Environment: Free International Trade and
Protection of the Environment: Irreconcilable Conflict?, 86 AM. J. INT'L L. 700 (1992).
3 See GATT art. XX.
4 Chris Wold, Multilateral Environmental Agreements and the GATT: Conflict and
Resolution?, 26 ENVTL L. 841, 847 (1996).
1 See World Trade Organization, The 128 Countries That Had Signed GAiT by 1994, at
http://www.wto.org/english/thewto-e/whatis-e/tif-e/org6_e.htm (last visited Nov. 8, 2003).
6 See Hilary Ross, Genetically Modified Food: The EU Regulatory "Maize", 18 NAT.
REsouRcEs & ENV'T 9, 9-11 (2003) (discussing EU member states response to the introduction
of GM foods into Europe, which included the separation of GM foods from their traditional
counterparts, stringent labeling requirements, and eventually the placement of a de facto
moratorium that restricts the processing of GM foods).
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the importation and use of genetically modified organisms (GMOs) in the
name of human health and environmental safety.7 With continued GMO
support from the United States, the EU has attempted to utilize the precaution-
ary principle to uphold its use of protective restrictions on genetically modified
products absent specific proof of actual GMO harm.8
While there is a consensus among most countries regarding the need to
provide these safeguards for consumers and the environment, the scientific
uncertainty surrounding biotechnology has hindered the ability to accurately
predict potential harms accurately.' Although it is evident that risks do exist,
including allergic and toxic human reactions to the genetically altered
products,'0 supporters of genetically modified products remain positive about
the overall benefits provided by this scientific advancement." Skeptics warn,
however, that so many unknown risk factors could cause long-term and
irreparable damage to our existing ecosystem.'2
In reconciling the conflict between promoting international trade and
protecting the environment, "the question which must be addressed by future
policy makers is not which aspect should prevail, but rather how to create
harmony between the two."' 3 With the emergence of GMOs on the global
market, fundamental principles of international trade are being hampered by
' See Mary Lynne Kupchella, Note, Agricultural Biotechnology: Why It Can Save the
Environment and Developing Nations, But May Never Get a Chance, 25 WM. & MARY ENVTL
L. & POL'YREv. 721, 735 (2001).
' See Center for Progressive Regulation, The Precautionary Principle, at http://www.
progressiveregulation.org/perspectives/precaution.html (last visited Nov. 8, 2003) (discussing
the EU Treaty that adopted the precautionary principle as the guide for environmental policy,
and describing the principle as one that "applies where scientific evidence is insufficient,
inconclusive or uncertain and preliminary scientific evaluation indicates that there are reasonable
grounds for concern that the potentially dangerous effects on the environment, human, animal
or plant health may be inconsistent with the high level of protection chosen by the EU").
9 See Jonathan A. Glass, The Merits of Ratifying and Implementing the Cartagena Protocol
on Biosafety, 21 NW. J. INT'LL. & Bus. 491, 512 (2001).
'0 See Mickey Z., GM Food for Thought, at http://www.alternet.org/story.html?StorylD=-
16317 (July 2, 2003).
" See Darren Smits & Sean Zaboroski, Trade and Genetically Modified Foods: GMOs:
Chumps or Champs of International Trade?, 1 ASPER REV. INT'L Bus. & TRADE L. 111, 113
(2001); see also Brett Grosko, Note, Genetic Engineering and International Law: Conflict or
Harmony? An Analysis of the Biosafety Protocol, GATT and the WTO Sanitary and
Phytosanitary Agreement, 20 VA. ENvTL L.J. 295, 299 (2001).
12 See Grosko, supra note 11, at 301-02.
" Jennifer A. Bernazani, Note, The Eagle, the Turtle, the Shrimp and the WTO: Implications
for the Future of Environmental Trade Measures, 15 CONN. J. INT'L L. 207, 208 (2000).
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an inability to reconcile this new technology with existing trade provisions.
With no consistent standard imposed by the WTO, members on opposing sides
of this dispute are wary about relying on outdated dispute settlement
mechanisms when both consumer and environmental safety are at risk. 4
At the center of this conflict over GMOs are fundamental legal and cultural
differences that have placed the United States and the European Union on
opposite sides of the debate. 5 Recently, the U.S.-EU debate over GMO
restrictions has prompted a situation that skeptics warn could ultimately
become a full-scale trade war: several developing countries in Africa have
emerged as middlemen being forced to choose between the two powerhouses,
greatly compounding the fight.' 6 While concern surrounding this debate
initially focused only on the U.S.-EU conflict, the real harm resulting from this
conflict seems likely to fall upon those developing countries that lack the
economic and political standing necessary to take a strong position on the trade
and environmental issues at stake.'"
In addition to cultivating GMOs domestically for sale both at home and on
the world market, the United States is also the largest contributor of relief food
to the World Food Program (WFP), an organization that provides food aid to
developing countries." United States officials do not deny that a majority of
the food products it provides for use and consumption by developing countries,
including several within Africa, have undergone some level of genetic
modification.' 9 However, severe trade restrictions being imposed by countries
within Europe against those who utilize GMO technology to create biotech
crops has prompted a backlash by both critics of biotechnology and the
14 See id. at 212-13.
"5 See Heather Befit Freeman, Note, Trade Epidemic: The Impact of the Mad Cow Crisis on
EU-U.S. Relations, 25 B.C. ImNL & COMP. L. REv. 343, 365 (2002).
16 See Wambui Chege, Africa Mulls GMO as Debate Rages, Hunger Claws, Reuters, at
http://www.planetark.org/dailynewsstory.cftn/newsid/17120/newsDate/l-Aug-2002/story.htm
(Aug. 1, 2002) (discussing the much needed, and largely genetically-modified, food aid offered
by the United States to those starving in southern Africa, and the potential backlash by the EU
should that food aid be accepted).
"7 Anup Shah, Free Trade and Globalization: The WTO and Free Trade, at http://www.
globalissues.orgltraderelated/freetradewto.asp (last updated Dec. 27,2001) (discussing criticism
towards the WTO by various groups and third world countries for limiting public participation
and, ultimately, creating barriers to free trade); see generally Lewis Machipisa, Africans Worried
US to Force Unlabeled GE Foods on Them: US-EU Dispute Over GMO Worries Consumers,
at http://www.organicconsumers.org/gefood/africansO9240l.cfm (Sept. 21, 2001).
IS Chege, supra note 16.
'9 See id.
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potential recipients of food aid who blame the United States for "inflam[ing]
a debate in starving southern Africa about the gene-altered foods."20
Developing countries in Africa that are impacted by an ongoing hunger
epidemic remain concerned that the EU could halt ongoing trade essential to
their economies.2 They fear that the genetically modified foods offered by the
United States to help eliminate harmful food shortages could contaminate
Africa's remaining food and grain supply.22 Furthermore, GMO opponents
within Africa remain concerned that the prophesied environmental harm could
be realized, contaminating plants, animals, and humans alike. GMO
proponents, however, are frustrated by the ongoing refusal by many African
countries to accept the U.S. offer of food aid since many believe that the
benefits of GMO technology, which could provide food aid to over thirteen
million people currently starving in Africa, outweigh the potential harms.23
The difficulty in finding some resolution to the GMO dispute is further
compounded by the ongoing "intergovernmental squabbling" within the EU.
Furthermore, the-current EU position appears to stand in direct opposition to
the WTO's underlying principal encouraging free trade among all of its
members.2
5
These fundamental differences between the United States and the EU
appear to be laying the foundation for the next WTO dispute, likely in the form
of opposition by the United States to the EU's use of GATT's subsidiary
Sanitary and Phytosanitary (SPS) Agreement26 as the basis for imposing overly
restrictive trade measures on GMOs. While the underlying purpose of the SPS
Agreement is to prevent restrictions on international trade disguised as health
20 id.
21 See Franz Kruger, GM Foodfor Thought (Radio Netherlands radio broadcast, Aug. 19,
2002), at http://www.rnw.nl/hotspots/html/gmo02O826.html (last visited Nov. 8, 2003).
' See id.(discussing Zimbabwe's fear that "GM grain meant as food could sprout, and end
up contaminating the country's own domestic varieties").
2 See Chege, supra note 16.
24 Editorial, A Harvest of Discord, WASH. TIMEs, Oct. 15, 2002, at A16, available at http:l/
www.thecampaign.org/News/octO2x.htm (last visited Nov. 8, 2003) (discussing the internal
dispute among some EU members centering on the amount of genetically modified material that
must be present in food before a label is required; Sweden has reportedly demanded a "zero
tolerance" policy, while other Member States have suggested a slightly more generous
allowance).
5 See generally Shah, supra note 17 (stating that the WTO is "the primary international
body to help promote free trade, by drawing up the rules of international trade").
26 Agreement on the Application of Sanitary and Phytosanitary Measures, Apr. 15, 1994,
Marrakesh Agreement Establishing the World Trade Organization, Annex IA, art. 2, para. 5,
available at 1994 WL 761483 (hereinafter SPS Agreement].
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and safety measures, many GMO opponents assert that the SPS Agreement
lacks an ability to deal with the complex scientific issues created by biotech-
nology.27 If the SPS Agreement is unable to resolve the conflict that has
resulted, the Cartagena Protocol on Biosafety (Biosafety Protocol)' promises
to fill in the gaps. Drafted and implemented by parties to the Convention on
Biological Diversity,29 the Biosafety Protocol is the first agreement promising
hope for those countries concerned about OMO contamination, and ultimately
GMO regulation.3" The Protocol provides protection by incorporating (1) a
requirement for "advance informed agreement" for international trade of
genetically modified products, (2) inclusion of a precautionary principle, and
(3) a bio-safety "clearing house" where countries will share information about
genetically modified products and technology."
On October 16, 2002, legislation expected to bring an end to a four-year
moratorium on the sale and use of GMOs within the EU took effect throughout
that region.32 Along with the new legislation will come what is described as
the "toughest GM licensing laws in the world-[that] will ensure that all GM
food and crops undergo a series of rigorous risk assessment tests before they
are authorised for sale, marketing, or even planting anywhere in the EU."'33
Media reports indicate that "U.S. officials have left open the possibility of
bringing a legal case before the WTO, which, after lengthy litigation, could
27 Kara-Anne Yaren, Trade and Genetically Modified Foods: Frankenfears: A Call for
Consistency, 1 AsPER REV. INT'L BUS. & TRADE L. 149 (2001).
28 Cartegena Protocol on Biosafety to the Convention on Biological Diversity, Jan. 29,2000,
39 I.L.M. 1027, available at http:llwww.biodiv.orglbiosafety/protocol.asp (last visited Nov. 8,
2003) [hereinafter Biosafety Protocol].
29 See Secretariat of the Convention on Biological Diversity, Sustaining Life on Earth: How
the Convention on Biological Diversity Promotes Nature and Human Well-being, at 2 (Apr.
2000), available at http:lwww.biodiv.org/doc/publications/cbd-sustain-en.pdf (last visited Nov.
8, 2003) (discussing the 1992 Earth Summit held in Rio de Janeiro, at which the Convention of
Biological Diversity was adopted "[establishing] three main goals: the conservation of biological
diversity, the sustainable use of its components, and the fair and equitable sharing of the benefits
from the use of genetic resources").
" See Centre for Science and Environment, Biosafety Protocol Watered Down by U.S.
Interests, at http://www.corpwatch.orglissuestPID.jsp?articleid=575 (Feb. 29, 2000) (discussing
the new international framework that has been created to regulate GMOs).
31 Id.
32 See Andrew Osborn, New EU Rules to End Ban on GM Food, GUARDIAN, Oct. 16,2002,
available at http://www.guardian.co.uk/gmdebate/Story/0,2763,813200,00.htrnl.
33 id.
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eventually impose a politically embarrassing judgment and stiff economic
penalties on Europe. 34
Fearing possible repercussions from the EU for failure to comply with the
new GMO labeling and production requirements, developing countries may
begin to require the same stringent labeling on all food and grain products
imported into their region if the pending EU legislation should come into
force. 5 United States opponents to the strict labeling rules believe that forcing
compliance would not only limit the reach of this cutting edge technology,
keeping a large portion of GMOs out of the hands of the developing countries
that are so desperate for food aid, but would also cost U.S. companies an
estimated $4 billion a year.36 Furthermore, the pending legislation would be
costly in terms of both the actual process of labeling and the scientific testing
necessary to guarantee accuracy.37
The long-argued debate over GMO technology, originally limited to
developed countries, seems to be causing newfound internal conflicts among
various developing countries." While "[m]ny developing-country govern-
ments are reluctant to accept the broadening of WTO rules to more clearly
enshrine the 'precautionary principle,' and the ability of governments to
restrict or label imports on health or environmental grounds... [they] wish to
restrict GM crop imports themselves."39 This is because the expansion of
existing WTO rules "may further restrict developing countries' access to
export markets where they are already struggling to meet international health
and environmental standards," and potential WTO expansion is considered by
some developing-country governments to be "a potential Trojan horse' for
protectionism by developed countries."
In examining the impact of GMO trade restrictions in light of existing legal
mechanisms created by the WTO to provide protection to member states, this
"' Alan Sipress & Marc Kaufman, U.S. Challenges EU's Biotech Food Standards, WASH.
POST, Aug. 26, 2001, available at http://www.gene.ch/genet/2001/Aug/msgOOO79.html.
11 See National Foreign Trade Council, Inc., Biotech Barriers Hurt Poor, Says NFTC, at
http://binas.unido.org/binas/news/2003-05-12.html (last visited Nov. 8, 2003) (discussing the
potential repercussions in the form of trade barriers imposed by the EU should developing
countries not place these stringent safeguards into place).
36 See Machipisa, supra note 17.
37 id.
" Oxfam, Genetically Modified Crops, World Trade and Food Security, at www.oxfam.org.
uk/what we-do/issues/trade/trade-grinhtm (date of original publication Nov. 1999) (full paper
on file with author).
39 id.
4 id.
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Note will focus on the impact of these international laws on developing
countries, with a particular focus on those within Africa. This analysis will
show that neither GATT nor the SPS provide the WTO' s under-developed and
developing members with the ability to take an independent position regarding
GMO imports against those countries upon which they must rely for ongoing
trade.
After analyzing the role of GATT with regard to GMO technology and
discussing the more applicable SPS Agreement, this Note will identify the
fundamental differences that divide the United States, the European Union, and
the developing countries of Africa on the issues of GMO production and use.
Next, this Note will consider the GMO debate in light of what some believe
may be the most applicable doctrine yet--dealing specifically with the
transboundary movement of GMOs-the Biosafety Protocol.' By clarifying
the relationship between the U.S.-EU conflict and its impact on developing
countries, including those within Africa, the necessity for urgent resolution
will become clearer.
This Note will identify various domestic regimes being proposed and
implemented among African countries-which attempt to combat the
developing nations' status as middlemen in the U.S.-EU tug-of-war-in an
attempt to reconcile them with existing international trade regulations.
Analysis of these regimes will show that current WTO regulations do not
adequately protect the interests of developing countries caught in this potential
trade war. In conclusion, this Note will call for the urgent reconciliation of
existing WTO Agreements with the Biosafety Protocol, a congruence that is
vital to the satisfactory resolution of this ongoing trade dispute.
I. BACKGROUND OF THE WORLD TRADE ORGANIZATION
Central to resolving this ongoing debate, and the possible implications that
could result from developing countries currently in the middle of this dispute,
is the need for a basic understanding of the historical use of GATT provisions
to justify trade barriers in the name of environmental protection. For almost
" See Mark King, The Dilemma of Genetically Modified Products at Home and Abroad, 6
DRAKE J. AGRIC. L. 241,253 (2001) (stating that "[t]he first agreement directly regulating trade
in GMOs is a response from growing worldwide fear from the growth of the GMO industry," and
that it seeks to implement (1) a precautionary principle to protect the environment, (2) a
biosafety clearing-house where information may be gathered and centrally located, and (3)
labeling requirements for "shipments that 'may contain' bioengineered commodities"); see also
Smits & Zaboroski, supra note 11, at 124.
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sixty years, GATT has remained the fundamental agreement underlying
successful international trade.42 Although GATT panel decisions made in
conjunction with prior international disputes have been anything but
predictable,43 the long-term interpretation of GATT's language by the WTO
indicates a likely outcome in the event a trade dispute over the EU's current
restrictions on GMOs should arise.
A. GATT: The Uruguay Round
Drafted in 1947, GATT is "the foundation for a multilateral trading system
encompassing more than 100 member states." GATT signatory members
have a basic obligation not to discriminate among other members in the form
of tariffs or trade barriers."5 Founded on the principle of comparative
advantage, the GATT system implements liberal trade policies, which in turn
allows the best goods and services to be sold at the lowest prices." In response
to trading needs, producers remain under competitive pressure to increase both
product and service quality while simultaneously lowering the cost.47 The
economic effect of comparative advantage is an increase of total world
wealth."8 Although the GATT originally lacked an administrative body, and
thus had no effective mechanism to enforce compliance, it was an overall
success.
49
Almost fifty years after GATT was originally drafted, the effectiveness of
this trade-liberalizing document appeared to be fading. Some member states
would deviate from their most-favored-nation and national treatment
42 See World Trade Organization, GATT 1994: What is it?, Background: The Two GAITs,
at http://www.wto.org/english/thewto-e/whatis-e/eol/e/wto02/ wto2_4.htm (last visited Nov.
9, 2003) (explaining that GAT 1947 provided the basic rules for international trade beginning
January 1, 1948).
'1 Carrie Wofford, Note, A Greener Future at the WTO: The Refinement of WTO
Jurisprudence on Environmental Exceptions to GATT, 24 HARv. ENVTL. L. REv. 563, 572
(2000).
' Bernazani, supra note 13, at 214.
45 Dale Arthur Oesterle, The WTO Reaches Out to the Environmentalists: Is It Too Little,
Too Late?, 1999 COLO. J. INT'L ENVrL. L. & POL'Y 1, 3-4 (2000).
"Kevin C. Kennedy, The GA7T-WTO System at Fifiy, 16 Wis. INT'L L.J. 421,424 (1998).
"7id.
4Id.
" Joseph N. Eckhardt, Note, Balancing Interests in Free Trade and Health: How the WHO's
Framework Convention on Tobacco Control Can Withstand WTO Scrutiny, 12 DUKE J. COMP.
& INT'LL. 197, 200-01 (2002).
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obligations using waivers to bypass the international regulations.50 Other
members employed import and export quotas, and in effect ignored their
obligations under GATT.51 And prior to the 1994 creation of the WTO, those
who objected to GATT violations had no effective means of resolution because
no real dispute settlement mechanism had ever been instituted.52 Importnatly,
the original GATT provisions left undefined any requisite scientific standard
to be applied when a dispute did arise and therefore left no true means to
resolve any scientifically based conflicts.53 Resolution of many of these
problems came in the Uruguay Round. 4
In 1994, the WTO was formally created, and with it came better mecha-
nisms for dispute settlement among member states. 55 The Dispute Settlement
Understanding (DSU) established a comprehensive mechanism by which to
settle conflicts.5 6 In light of the various trade barrier disputes that were already
underway by the early 1990s, GATT 1994 spoke for the first time directly to
the controversy between trade and the environment. 57 The preamble to GATT
1994 states the WTO's primary objective of:
allowing for the optimal use of the world's resources in accor-
dance with the objective of sustainable development, seeking
both to protect and preserve the environment and to enhance the
means for doing so in a manner consistent with their respective
needs and concerns at different levels of economic develop-
ment.58
Trade barriers that were traditionally considered violative of basic GATT
provisions have more recently been considered justified when used to promote
o Kennedy, supra note 46, at 442.
" Id.
52 id.
11 Theofanis Christoforou, Settlement of Science-Based Trade Disputes in the WTO: A
Critical Review of the Developing Case Law in the Face of Scientific Uncertainty, 8 N.Y.U.
ENVmL L.J. 622,625 (2000).
5 Id
1s George E.C. York, Note, Global Foods, Local Tastes and Biotechnology: The New Legal
Architecture of International Agriculture Trade, 7 COLUM. J. EUR. L. 423, 459-60 (2001).
5 Id.
57 See Bernazani, supra note 13, at 214.
58 Agreement Establishing the World Trade Organization, Apr. 15, 1994, 33 I.L.M. 1144,
pmbl. (1994).
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and protect human and environmental welfare. 9 When GATT was re-drafted
in 1994, conditional exceptions were included in Article XX that "may be
applied tojustify environmentally inspired rules that collide with trade." The
most common method of environmental protection used by WTO members is
adoption of an environmental trade measure (ETM)-a restriction on
international trade to promote an environmental objective." Though variations
do exist, trade measures currently utilized in the name of human and
environmental protection typically include standards, tariffs, import/export
restrictions and sanctions. 2 Before further examination of the trade restric-
tions permitted by GATT, it is important to understand the goals and policies
underlying GATT.
B. GA T's Pillars: Articles L III, and XI
Articles I and I, which contain the two non-discrimination principles63
considered central to the success of international trade, form the basic
framework of GATT's trade-protective mechanisms." The most-favored-
nation principle contained within Article I demands equal treatment of like
products between all contracting parties, and extends beyond the product
themselves to include equal treatment of customs charges and duties, internal
taxes, and other regulations imposed prior to and during distribution. 5 Article
HI, on the other hand, embodies the national treatment principle and requires
equal internal treatment of both imported and domestic products.' GATT
requires that imported products must be given "treatment no less favourable
" Thomas J. Schoenbaum, International Trade and Protection of the Environment: The
Continuing Search for Reconciliation, 91 AM. J. INT'L L. 268, 273-74 (1997) (discussing the
recent use of GATT 1947 Article XX to "justify environmentally inspired rules that collide with
trade").
60 Id. at 273.
61 See Bernazani, supra note 13, at 209.
62 id.
I Non-discrimination principles utilized by the WTO have two components, and include
most-favoured-nation (MFN) treatment (which involves "treating one's trading partners
equally") and national treatment (which requires "equal treatment for foreign and domestic goods
and services"). These principles prevent "the abuse of environmental [policies] and their use as
protectionism in disguise." See World Trade Organization, Relevant WTO Provisions:
Descriptions, at http://www.wto.org/english/tratop-elenvir-etissu3_e.htm (last visited Nov. 9,
2003) [hereinafter WTO Provisions].
"See GAIT art. I, Iii.
65 Schoenbaum, supra note 59, at 27 1.
6See GAIT art. III.
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than that accorded to like products of national origin."'67 This phrase has been
interpreted to require that imported products be given a chance to equally
compete with domestic products.68 In addition, GATT Article XI restricts
contracting parties from placing any quantitative restrictions, such as quotas,
on imports.69
These non-discrimination provisions of GATT are often mentioned when
disputes over the discriminatory impact resulting from restrictions on trade
arise.7" However, trade measures intended to protect health and the environ-
ment may be permitted, regardless of any discriminatory effect, if they are
found to actually serve the stated objective of health or environmental
protection." Still, those who wish to utilize restrictive barriers to trade as
protective mechanisms, while remaining in compliance with existing GATT
provisions, must meet a high burden of proof to justify their use.72 Although
past WTO decisions involving violations of Articles I, In, and XI have shown
a tendency to uphold the non-discrimination principles central to GATT,73
recent advances in biotechnology leave uncertainty about the outcome should
the dispute over GMOs ever arrive before the WTO.74
C. GATT Article XX
When environmental trade measures act as discriminatory barriers to free
trade, they must be justified under one of the Article XX exceptions.75
Recently, the controversy between trade and the environment has called
increasing attention to the "green exceptions" contained in Article XX.76
67 Id. para. 2.
68 Schoenbaum, supra note 59, at 272.
69 id.
70 See generally id at 271-74 (discussing GAT"s two nondiscrimination principles, the
most-favored-nation principle and the national treatment principle, which require equality of
treatment among like products, and the quota provisions, which also applies to "other measures"
that may be imposed on the import or export of goods).71 Id. at 274.
' John S. Applegate, Sustainable Development, Agriculture, and the Challenge of
Genetically Modified Organisms: The Prometheus Principle: Using the Precautionary Principle
to Harmonize the Regulation of Genetically Modified Organisms, 9 IND. J. GLoBAL LEGAL STUD.
207,238 (2001).
71 See Schoenbaum, supra note 59, at 271-74.
74 See id.
75 See Bernazani, supra note 13, at 215.
76 See id.
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Although WTO members may use the exceptions to justify environmentally
protective measures that restrict international trade, past WTO panel decisions
indicate that qualifying restrictive trade barriers under Article XX is difficult."
Historically, GATT panels have narrowly construed the language in Article
XX in favor of trade and against non-tariff barriers to trade.7" Because the
language has been so narrowly interpreted, restrictive trade measures enacted
under the guise of environmental protection often fail to qualify as ETMs.
79
Reasons cited most often by the panels when overruling a restrictive measure
are the discriminatory impact of a barrier and the availability of less discrimi-
natory measures.80
Of the ten exceptions enumerated under GATT Article XX, the public
health and safety exception and the exception for conservation of natural
resources relate most directly to the pursuit of environmental protection."1
Specifically, Article XX, sections (b) and (g) allow members to enact measures
that would ordinarily violate their obligations under GATT. 2 Specifically,
GATT allows that:
Subject to the requirement that such measures are not applied in
a manner which would constitute a means of arbitrary or unjusti-
fiable discrimination between countries where the same condi-
tions prevail, or a disguised restriction on international trade,
nothing in this Agreement shall be construed to prevent the
adoption or enforcement by any contracting party of
measures: ...
(b) necessary to protect human, animal or plant life or health;...
(g) relating to the conservation of exhaustible natural resources
if such measures are made effective in conjunction with restric-
tions on domestic production or consumption; .... 83
" See Schoenbaum, supra note 59, at 274 (discussing how the "burden of showing that an
Article XX exception applies... has not been carried often, largely because of the strictness
with which its provisions are interpreted").
78 See id.
9 See id.
o See Kennedy, supra note 46, at 459.
sI See generally id at436-38 (discussing the ability of WTO members to impose restrictions
on free trade when necessary to protect health).
2 See GATT art. XX(I)(b), (g). Editors Note: These two provisions are commonly referred
to as paragraphs (b) and (g) of Article XX, and this Note follows that convention, through the
provisions are subsection within paragraph I of Article XX.
83 id.
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In addition to qualifying under paragraphs (b) and (g), measures must also
meet the standards set up in the introductory paragraph of Article XX,
traditionally known as the chapeau, which prohibits: (1) arbitrary or unjustifi-
able discrimination between countries where the same conditions prevail, or
(2) a disguised restriction on international trade."' While many ETMs appear
to be justified under one exception of GATT or another, member states must
still overcome the more stringent requirements of Article XX's chapeau. 5
What has resulted is the notion that a restrictive trade measure enacted to
support health and environmental safety will be held to violate the chapeau of
Article XX if its effect is the differential application of a measure as to
domestic and foreign products. 6
1. Article XX(b)
Article XX(b) of the GATT allows WTO member states to discriminate
against products that pose a threat to human, animal, or plant life or health. 7
When restrictive trade measures are intended to protect public health or safety,
paragraph (b) requires that they be strictly necessary for the objective being
pursued. 8 However, members are prevented from utilizing the exception as
a disguised trade barrier or an arbitrary form of discrimination against
imports. 9
In trying to determine whether a restriction qualifies under the XX(b)
exception, it is helpful to use a three prong-test. This test will help determine
whether the measure (1) is necessary, with no less restrictive alternative
8 Schoenbaum, supra note 59. at 274; see also Bernazani, supra note 13, at 222.
8S See Schoenbaum, supra note 59, at 274-75 (citing Standards for Reformulated and
Conventional Gasoline, Appellate Body Report, 35 I.LM. 603 (1996) (discussing the Appellate
Body findings upholding the use of Article XX(g) to support the distinction made between the
composition of foreign and domestic gasoline, but finding that the application of such a standard
served as a disguised restriction on international trade and thus violated the chapeau)).
6 See generally id. at 272-74 (explaining that measures, which qualify under a GATT Art.
XX exception, may not be justified if it is found to be either "arbitrary or unjustifiable
discrimination between countries where the same conditions prevail" or "a disguised restriction
on international trade").17 GATT" art. XX(1)(b).
88 Philip Bentley Q.C., A Re-Assessment of Article XX, Paragraphs (b) and (g) of GATT
1994 in the Light of Growing Consumer and Environmental Concern About Biotechnology, 24
FORDHAM INT'L L.J. 107, 112 (2000).
" See James F. Smith, From Frankenfood to Fruit Flies: Navigating the WTO/SPS, 6 U.C.
DAVIS J. INT'L L. & POL'Y 1, 5-6 (2000).
" Schoenbaum, supra note 59, at 276.
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available, (2) does not unjustifiably or arbitrarily discriminate between
countries, upholding both the most-favored-nation and the national treatment
principles, and (3) does not act as a disguised restriction on international
trade.9' Under the current interpretation, for a measure to qualify as necessary
under the current interpretation of XX(b), it must be "among the measures
reasonably available to it, that which entails the least degree of inconsistency
with other GATT provisions."92
2. Article XX(g)
Article XX, paragraph (g) of the GATT permits restrictive trade measures
that are intended to protect against the exhaustion of natural resources. 93
Unlike the Article XX(b) health and safety exception, there is no requirement
in paragraph (g) that the restrictive measures be necessary to protect those
resources.94 In the past, panels have created an uncertain standard with their
varying interpretation of the phrase "relating to." The varying lingual
interpretations have included: (1) restrictions qualify under Article XX(g) as
long as the effect actually "serves the purpose of conservation," and (2) Article
XX(g) requires a restriction to be "necessary or essential." '95 Another question
has been raised by those who oppose restrictive trade measures permitted by
the Article XX(g) exception, since the language is unclear regarding the
specific inclusion of "exhaustible natural resources. " In deciding the scope
of coverage for the exhaustible natural resources protected by Article XX(g),
past decisions have qualified gasoline, clean air, and even sea turtles as being
protected.97
91 See Kennedy, supra note 46, at 437, 457.
9 Report of the GATT Panel, United States-Restrictions on Imports of Tuna, reprinted in
33 I.L.M. 839 (1994).
9 See id.
94 See id.; see also Bentley, supra note 88, at 112.
" Schoenbaum, supra note 59, at 278.
96 See iL at 277-78.
97 id.
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D. Agreement on the Application of Sanitary and Phytosanitary Measures
(SPS)
Successfully completed in 1994, the Uruguay Round reaffirmed the WTO
commitment to GATT's open trade objective.9" Unable to amend substantive
portions of GATT, the WTO also sought to elaborate on provisions that lacked
necessary clarity. The result was an adoption by the WTO of two agreements
intended to address the existing "gray areas" left by GATT's provisions that
included the Article XX exceptions."
The SPS Agreement was an attempt by the WTO to elaborate on the
existing health and safety exception contained in Article XX(b). " Opponents,
however, will quickly point out that "the SPS is a trade agreement, not a health
agreement... which targets only the overuse of national health regulation...
while containing no minimum standard for food safety or for applying science
to the food production process."' 0 ' Although GATT provided general
guidance for handling sanitary and phytosanitary measures in Article XX(b),
the SPS Agreement attempts to elaborate on general procedural requirements
to be followed by those member states seeking protection of human, animal,
or plant life or health.'02
In defining the coverage of its measures, the SPS Agreement includes
protection from the "establishment or spread of pests, diseases, disease-
carrying organisms or disease causing organisms," and the "risks arising from
additives, contaminants, toxins or disease-causing organisms in foods,
beverages or feedstuffs."' 3 Unlike any existing provisions of GATT, the SPS
Agreement also requires that restrictive trade regulations be founded upon
scientific evidence.'0 The agreement seeks to "ensure that an SPS measure is
in fact a scientifically-based protection against the risk asserted by the member
imposing the measure, and not a disguised barrier to trade."'0 5
98 See Kennedy, supra note 46, at 442-43; see also WTO Agreement.
99 See Schoenbaum, supra note 59, at 299.
100 York, supra note 55, at 457.
101 Id.
11 See Christoforou, supra note 53, at 625.
103 York, supra note 55, at 457-58.
'o See Robert Howse & Petros C. Mavroidis, Europe's Evolving Regulatory Strategy for
GMOs-The Issue of Consistency with WTO Law: Of Kine and Brine, 24 FORDHAM INT'L L.J.
317, 321 (2000).
105 Kevin C. Kennedy, Resolving International Sanitary and Phytosanitary Disputes in the
WTO: Lessons and Future Directions, 55 FOOD DRUG L.J. 81, 83 (2000).
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Fundamental to the success of the SPS Agreement is a risk assessment that
must be performed by any WTO member intending to impose sanitary or
phytosanitary measures. " While conducting the risk assessment, the member
state must "provide evidence probative of causal relationship between the SPS
measure it is about to enact and the disease it wants to address, in the sense
that its measure will be the antidote to the identified risks."'0 7 Mirroring the
language from Article XX's chapeau, the SPS Agreement requires this risk
assessment in order to ensure that the restrictive trade measures are not simply
disguised restrictions on international trade. 0 8 When the available scientific
evidence is insufficient, a precautionary exception permits members to adopt
a temporary restrictive measure once certain other requirements are met.19
E. Agreement on Technical Barriers to Trade (TBT)
Built upon the Tokyo Round Standards Code,"0 the Agreement on
Technical Barriers to Trade (TBT Agreement)'" established guidelines by
which members could "implement legitimate standards and the procedures for
assessing product conformity."'" 2 This agreement aspired to balance "national
interest in product standards against their unjustified use to protect a domestic
industry.""' 3 Similar to the basic provisions outlined under GATT, the TBT
Agreement employs a non-discrimination test to ensure appropriate compli-
ance.
1
'
4
The SPS and TBT Agreements remain mutually exclusive; TBT pertains
mainly to voluntary and mandatory labeling requirements that are not covered
106 York, supra note 55, at 458.
107 See Howse & Mavroidis, supra note 104, at 331.
'08 See Bentley, supra note 88, at 113-14.
109 Smith, supra note 89, at 10-11.
130 See World Trade Organiztion, TBT: Why An Agreement? From the Tokyo Round
Standards Code to the WTO TBT Agreement, athttp://www.wto.org/english/thewto-e/whatis-e/
eol/e/wto03/wto3_4.htm (last visited Nov. 19, 2003).
". See Agreement on Technical Barriers to Trade, Apr. 15, 1994, Marrakesh Agreement
Establishing the World Trade Organization, Annex IA, art. 1.5, 1994 WL 761483 [hereinafter
TBT Agreement].
12 Kennedy, supra note 46, at 460.
1 See King, supra note 41, at 250.
"4 Central to the TBT Agreement is the principle that requires member states to refrain from
discrimination "in the preparation, adoption and application of technical regulations, standards,
and conformity assessment procedures .. " WTO Provisions, supra note 63.
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by the SPS." 5 The TBT Agreement makes specific reference to Annex A of
SPS," 6 making "the SPS Agreement, [and] not the TBT Agreement, applicable
to labeling requirements directly related to food safety."" 7 The SPS Agree-
ment governs situations where "human, animal, or plant life or health are
jeopardized by pests, diseases, disease-carrying organisms, additives,
contaminants, or toxins,".. and therefore is central to resolving this GMO
debate.
11I. BIOTECHNOLOGY AND GMOs
"Nowhere is the convergence of, and conflict between, international
agricultural trade and food safety regulation more dramatically demonstrated
than in the case of biotechnology." 19 Among food producers, the phenomenon
of selectively breeding both plants and animals in an effort to isolate and
replicate the most favorable attributes has occurred for centuries. 120 However,
the 1973 discovery of cell cloning propelled this process beyond existing
scientific expectations.' 2 1 In 1992, the first genetically altered foods were put
up for sale on the open market. 2 2 What has resulted since the introduction of
GMOs into the international trade arena has "brought international agricultural
exporters to the brink of a trade war."123
Considering this widespread concern and potential for international
conflict, many may wonder what initially compelled scientists to toy with
Mother Nature. Ultimately, the promise of economic, health, and environmen-
tal rewards motivated them. Although the initial reception for GMOs seemed
promising, the considerable resistance exhibited by many key players in the
international agricultural import/export sector has resulted in some unexpected
consequences. 24 For example, resistant European consumers and environmen-
talists have successfully campaigned for strict government regulations where
"' Arthur E. Appleton, The Labeling of GMO Products Pursuant to International Trade
Rules, 8 N.Y.U. ENVTL L.J. 566 (2000).
116 See TBT Agreement, at 138.
117 See Appleton, supra note 115, at 572.
Ill Id.
119 York, supra note 55, at 425.
120 See Smits & Zaboroski, supra note 11, at 112.
121 id.
122 id.
123 York, supra note 55, at 425; see also Smits & Zaboroski, supra note 11, at 146.
124 York, supra note 55, at 426.
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GMOs are involved.'25 Proponents of GMO technology hope that both cost
reduction and improvement of product quality will have a positive societal
impact, especially within developing countries.2 6 Opponents, on the other
hand, fear that GMO supporters are overly ambitious and remain cautious
about the potential harms currently being predicted.'27 Seemingly unable to
compromise on any point, it appears that GMO critics and advocates may
never find a middle ground upon which to meet.
A. Benefits of Biotechnology
GMO supporters have long hailed the benefits achievable through
biotechnology, which promise the potential to "increase world food output and
reduce food insecurity by improving crop yields and reducing crop loss.' ' 2
More importantly, biotech supporters believe that "[c]onsumers in developing
countries will benefit if biotech crops are less expensive or more nutritious
than traditional crops."'29 Proponents urge that those benefits far outweigh
potential risks. 30 They also tout biotechnology as the best way to benefit those
developing countries that do not have the quality of land to sustain traditional
agricultural growth, or the quantity of land to improve existing agricultural
production.' With the promise of reducing a malnutrition epidemic that
exists in both under-developed and developing countries, the benefits promised
by GMO advocates include (1) improved nutritional value in the food itself,
(2) an ability to treat and prevent disease at a drastically reduced cost, and (3)
the anticipation of improved agricultural success.'32
B. Risks of Biotechnology
While proponents of GMOs support the many benefits being realized by
this technological advancement, its critics broadcast the inevitable risks that
seem likely to result. An underlying concern at the heart of those who resist
"5 See id. at 425.
126 See id. at 429.
127 See Smits & Zaboroski, supra note 11, at 114.
1 Lorraine Mitchell, Biotechnology and FoodSecurity, USDA Economic Research Service,
Agriculture Information Bulletine Number 765-11 (June 2001).
129 Id.
130 See York, supra note 55, at 429.
131 id.
13 Id. at 431.
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GMO technology is an ethical resistance to "playing God."'33 Fearful that
scientists have failed to anticipate harmful consequences, many believe it is the
immediate promise of economic return that has caused many to turn a blind
eye on "potentially devastating results."' 34 GMO opponents have several areas
of concern, which include the potential for (1) "unintended changes in the
competitiveness, virulence, or other characteristics of the target species,"' 35 (2)
"adverse impacts on non-target species (such as beneficial insects) and
ecosystems,"'" (3) "weediness in genetically modified crops (where a plant
becomes more invasive than the original, perhaps by transferring its genes to
wild relatives),' '137 and (4) "the possibilities that a gene will lose its effective-
ness or will be re-transferred to another host).' 38 In addition, many fear that
biotechnology is unlikely to significantly, or even sufficiently, address the
existing problem of malnutrition.139
Because genetic modification has advanced beyond "traditional science,"
the testing necessary to confirm or deny any potential for long-term negative
side effects resulting from the genetic manipulation could take years."o
Investors have already spent large sums of money to produce these genetically
altered products, which must await acceptance before they go bad.'41 GMO
proponents also point to the urgency of assisting developing countries with the
starvation and malnutrition epidemic that currently exists.'
" See Smits & Zaboroski, supra note 11, at 114.
13 Id.
"' See Biosafety Protocol, supra note 28, at Section a-6 (discussing potential risks of
biotechnology in question (a)(6) of the Frequently Asked Questions).
136 Id.
137 id.
13 id.
"9 See generally Carmelo Ruiz-Marrero, Biotechnology's Third Generation, From Golden
Rice to Anti-Viral Tomatoes-Good Health or Good Marketing?, Corpwatch, at http://www.
corpwatch.org/issues/PID.jsp?articleid=2228 (last visited Nov. 1I, 2003).
140 See Genetically Engineered Crops, at http://www.tdc.ca/gecrops.htm, tdc Marketing and
Management Consultation (last visited Nov. 11,2003) (discussing the fact that long-term effects
associated with using this technology are relatively unknown, and short-term effects are only
recently becoming known).
141 See Lee Egerstrom, Altered States: Awaiting the Evidence, ST. PAUL PIONEER PRESS,
available at http://www.tao.ca/-ban/200ARpprage.htm (last visited Nov. 11,2003) (discussing
the "Multinational chemical and pharmaceutical firms [that] have spent more than $100 billion
buying and consolidating seed genetics companies over the past five years in a race to lead the
biotech revolution").
"" See generally John Vidal, U.S. 'dumping unsold GM food on Africa', GUARDIAN,
available at http:lwww.guardian.co.uklgmdebate/StoryO,2763,805825,00.html (Oct. 7,2002)
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Environmentally, genetic manipulation could have unintended conse-
quences within the ecosystem. GMO opponents worry about the impact that
biodiversity may have on existing plants, animals, and insects.' Both cross
pollination and outbreeding create the threat of altering, or completely losing,
large-scale non-GM agriculture and species.'" In addition, the threat of "super
pests" exists, which would result if insects, weeds, or bacteria adapted to those
resistant traits that have been modified within existing GMOs.145 Ultimately,
many critics feel that it is poverty, rather than inadequate agriculture, that
remains the basis for hunger among the people of developing countries. 6
More expensive to purchase and maintain, genetically modified crops therefore
appear unlikely to solve the large-scale problem that currently exists in
underdeveloped areas of the world.'47
C. Are the Benefits and Risks Reconcilable?
GMO supporters argue that GMO regulations, when enforced with the same
intensity as those regulations governing other food products, should adequately
protect consumers.'" This would be especially true if the standard procedures
used to protect human health, outlined by the SPS Agreement, were followed.
With equally strong opponents to GMO technology, however, this conflict
could ultimately ignite into a full-blown trade war. 49 While the outcome
remains unpredictable, a great deal of focus has been placed on whether
existing trade mechanisms, such as the GATT and the SPS and TBT Agree-
ments, provide adequate recourse for WTO members seeking to protect
consumer and environmental interests.
(last visited Nov. 11, 2003) (stating that the food crisis, which currently affects more than
fourteen million people in six countries, mandates outside assistance).
143 York, supra note 55, at 433.
I" [d.
'45 Id. at 433-34.
'4 Id. at 434.
147 id.
'" See Bill Lambrecht, Petition to Stop Food Genetic and Bio Engineering, ST. LOUIS POST-
DISPATCH, available at http://www.heall.com/medicalfreedom/foodengineering.html (last visited
Nov. 11, 2003) (discussing the FDA position that "food from new plant varieties is 'generally
recognized as safe' and that it is no different than conventionally bred food in nutrition or in
requirements for storage and handling").
'9 See Steve Schifferes, New US-EU trade war looms, BBC NEWS, available at
http://news.bbc.co.uk/I/hi/business/2534179.stm (last visited Nov. 11, 2003).
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IV. CARTAGENA PROTOCOL ON BIOSAFETY
As it stands, the WTO is the key governing body responsible for overseeing
and implementing international trade laws involving both market access and
safety regulations of GMOs.'5 With uncertainty about the effectiveness of
existing protective trade mechanisms mounting, it becomes important to
consider whether alternative provisions aimed at providing human and
environmental protection in light of biotechnological advancement are
reconcilable with existing WTO legal authority.
The Cartegena Protocol on Biosafety (Biosafety Protocol) was established
by the United Nations subsequent to the 1994 conclusion of the Uruguay
Round in response to the increasing conflicts over biotechnology.' Adopted
by the Conference of the Parties to the Convention of Biological Diversity on
January 29, 2000,152 the Biosafety Protocol seeks to resolve concerns involving
trade restrictions that are intended to protect health and the environment by
creating "rules regulating the transboundary movement of GMOs. '' 5 3 Though
the Biosafety Protocol lacks the force of international law, the requisite fifty
member states had ratified it by June 13, 2003.' On September 11, 2003, the
Protocol officially entered into force among those countries that consented to
be bound by it. 5
Positioned on opposite sides of the debate since the argument began, the
United States and the EU remain head to head even after the implementation
of the Biosafety Protocol. However, the language in the Protocol includes
what some argue is "a lot of 'creative ambiguity,' which has resulted in claims
of victory from both sides of the Atlantic."' 56 With developing countries,
including those of Africa, now placed squarely in the center of this conflict,
there appear to be no consistent international guidelines upon which to rely.
Once ratified by fifty member states, the Biosafety Protocol implemented
's See York, supra note 55, at 455.
I See The Cartagena Protocol on Biosafety, 8 ECON. PERSP. 3 (Sept. 2003), at http://usinfo.
state.gov/journals/ites/0903/ijee/cartagena.htm (last updated July 21, 2003) (discussing the
Biosafety Protocol's ratification process and its subsequent entry into force on Sept. 11, 2003)
[hereinafter Cartagena Protocol].
152 Id.
113 King, supra note 41, at 253; see also Smits & Zaboroski, supra note 11, at 124.i5 See generally Cartagena Protocol, supra note 151.
'5 Id. (indicating that the requisite number of member states had signed the Protocol, and it
would subsequently enter into force on September 11, 2003).
"ss King, supra note 41, at 253.
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several new guidelines intended to help regulate the transboundary movement
of GMOs, including (1) an Advanced Informed Agreement (AIA) procedure
intended to "ensure that countries are provided with the information necessary
to make informed decisions before agreeing to the import of GMOs into their
territory, '.57 (2) reference to a precautionary principle, and (3) establishment
of a Biosafety Clearing-House. 58
Generally limited in scope to Living Modified Organisms (LMOs), the
Protocol currently defines included products more narrowly and is not intended
to include GMOs that are merely food or feed incapable of reproduction., 59
LMOs must, however, utilize labeling requirements whereby shipments declare
that they either contain, or potentially contain, genetically modified products.
Finally, the Protocol dictates the process by which nations may create rules
and procedures to deal with liability and reparation in the event damage
ultimately results from the transboundary movement of GMOs. Although
the Biosafety Protocol is not intended to regulate food or feed such as corn,
soybeans, and other agricultural products deemed unable to reproduce, a
multitude of developing countries have urged that the possibility of spillage or
other environmental contamination by already cultivated genetically modified
products could make the Protocol applicable to GMOs not currently classified
as "living" organisms. 6' The Protocol may, therefore, apply to a greater
portion of GMOs than originally believed. If ratified and implemented, the
Biosafety Protocol will likely become a key piece in the ongoing debate over
Africa's potential acceptance of food aid in the form of genetically altered
maize and grain. 1
62
157 See Responsible management of GMOs: Commission proposes EU implementation of
Cartagena Protocol on Biosafety, Commission Press Release (IP/02/299), at http:Ilwww.
foodlaw.rdg.ac.uk/news/eu-02020.htm (last visited Feb. 11,2003); see also Grosko, supra note
11, at 296.
"' See Responsible management of GMOs: Commission proposes EU implementation of
Cartagena Protocol on Biosafety, supra note 157; see also Alex Kirby, Doubts Beset Biosafety
Treaty, BBC News Online, May 27, 2003, at http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/low/science/nature/
2941036.stm (last visited Nov. 11,2003) (discussing establishment by the Protocol of a clearing-
house in Montreal, Canada).
159 See Grosko, supra note 11, at 304.
160 Id. at 297.
161 Id. at 319.
1'6 See id. at 319.
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V. INTERNATIONAL TRADE LAWS AND THE GMO CRISIS:
A LEGAL ANALYSIS
Within existing international trade law, both GATT and the SPS Agreement
remain in force and applicable to this expanding GMO debate.'63 With no long-
term historical evidence to use as a guideline, however, it is difficult to reach
any definitive conclusion regarding the outcome of a WTO dispute over GMO
regulations, should one actually arise. The last decade has seen an enormous
attempt by the WTO-though deemed by many to be unsuccessful-to
implement protective trade mechanisms that simultaneously provide some
level of recourse with regard to health and environmental concerns.'
GATT permits exceptions to free trade to be made when health and
environmental risks exist.6 5 Within the context of international law, however,
both the SPS and TBT Agreements take precedence over GATT." "If the
requirements of the SPS Agreement are satisfied, the requirements of GATT
Article XX(b), as well as its chapeau, are presumed to be met."' 67 The SPS
Agreement requires member states to "ensure that any sanitary or
phytosanitary measure is applied only to the extent necessary to protect human,
animal or plant life or health"'6 and further demands that any protective
measure be "based on scientific principles . . . not maintained without
sufficient scientific evidence." 69 In the tradition of GATT, the SPS Agree-
ment also prohibits arbitrary or unjustified discrimination among its
members.7 °
Unlike the GATT, the SPS Agreement requires member states to take into
account available scientific evidence to determine the legitimacy of restrictive
trade measures.' However, GMO proponents remain concerned about the
applicability of SPS to the GMO debate since it specifies its primary objective
as one "minimizing negative trade effects"'7 and further requires members to
16 See Schoenbaum, supra note 59 passim.
164 Id.
165 Id.
'" Appleton, supra note 115, at 571.
167 Id.
"' SPS Agreement, art. 2 para. 2.
169 Id.
170 Id. para. 3.
171 Id. art. 5, para. 2.
'7 Id. art. 5, para. 4.
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"ensure that such measures are not more trade-restrictive than required to
achieve their appropriate level of sanitary or phytosanitary protection. 13
Particularly relevant to this analysis is the portion of the SPS Agreement
that discusses Special and Differential (S&D) Treatment of developing
countries. 74 Within the framework of Article 10 of the SPS Agreement,
developing countries are permitted to extend the time allocated for SPS
compliance and may violate certain restrictions instituted by developed
countries.75 The committee governing the SPS Agreement is also permitted
to make additional exceptions for developing countries when "their financial,
trade and development needs" so dictate.' 76 Ultimately, the SPS Agreement
encourages its members to help "facilitate the active participation of develop-
ing country Members in the relevant international organizations." '77
With the inclusion in the SPS Agreement of a provision dictating preferen-
tial treatment for developing members, some might argue that one need look
no further for effective legal guidelines regarding international GMO trade
laws. GMO opponents, however, point to the potentially devastating harms
that could result from this advanced technology, which supports their
proposition that uniform international guidelines over GMOs are needed
immediately.
A. Developed Countries: U.S./EU Perspectives on GMO Technology
Varied reactions by the United States and the EU to GMO technology and
other technological developments within the food industry dramatically
illustrate the contrast between their legal positions. EU members that oppose
open trade of genetically modified food products cite multiple reasons for
implementing protective mechanisms restricting GMO trade, including (1) fear
of globalization leading to U.S. domination of the world food market, (2) a
desire for consumers to have an informed choice, (3) environmental concerns
regarding genetic manipulation and potentially harmful consequences to the
ecosystem, and (4) health concerns over the unknown damage that could result
from long-term human consumption.' Alternatively, the United States seems
1s dat. 5, para. 6.
1'4 Id. art. 10.
"I id. art. 10, para. 2.
176 Id. art. 10, para. 3.
'77 Id. art. 10, para. 4.
' Citizens for Health, Policy and Politics: GMO Regulation and Labeling, Citizens for
Health, at http://www.citizens.org/Food-water-safety/geneticengineering/gmo/Policy/GMO
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propelled by a desire to increase productivity and gain a competitive edge over
international agricultural trade. 79 If these two international competitors are
unable to find some middle-ground, it appears that predictions of a trade war
resulting in a dispute brought before the WTO may be realized sooner rather
than later.
Unlike the United States, which supports GMO production and use, the EU
has implemented various pieces of internal legislation to restrict production
and importation of genetically altered foods and products. Council Directive
97/35/EC (formerly Council Directive 90/220/EEC) is the primary EU
legislation dealing with the release of GMOs into the environment."0 Before
any person in the EU may release GMOs into the environment, they must
notify authorities within the country where release is to occur. 8 ' The EU
legislation has a dramatic impact on international trade, since the importa-
tion/use of genetically modified plant seeds must be reported. a2 In addition
to requiring notice to the appropriate authorities, the notification itself must be
submitted with a "full risk assessment, appropriate safety and emergency
response measures, and in the case of products, precise instructions and
conditions for use, plus a proposal for labelling and packaging."'8 3 In its
attempt to provide uniform domestic regulations regarding GMOs, the EU has
also adopted novel food regulations,"8 4 and labeling regulations.'85
policy.htm (last visited Nov. 8, 2003) (on file with author).
" See Marsha A. Echols, Food Safety Regulation in the European Union and the United
States: Different Cultures, Different Laws, 4 COLuM. J. EUR. L. 525, 529 (1998).
"0 Lisa Oladotter Sandblom, Genetically Modified Organisms (GMOs): A Transatlantic
Trade Dispute (2000) (unpublished M.A. thesis, Monterey Institute of International Studies) (on
file with the Monterey Institute International Commercial Diplomacy Project), http://www.
commercialdiplomacy.org/ma-projects/ma-sandblom4.htm (last visited Nov. 8, 2003).
'1 Id.
182 See id.
183 id.
"' European Parliament/Council Regulation 258/97, 1997 O.J. (L 43) 1 (requiring labels to
identify foods (1) with additives or flavorings from GMOs (2) that raise health or ethical
concerns, or (3) not equivalent to their traditional counterparts).
'8' See Council Regulation 1139/98, 1998 O.J. (L 159) 4. This regulation requires the
"labeling of foodstuffs containing or derived from Monsanto's RR soy and Novartis' sBt-Corn
to ensure the mandatory labeling of any food products that contain protein or DNA resulting
from genetic modification." Id.
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B. "The Middlemen": Developing Countries of Africa
While many concede that African countries are "increasingly finding
themselves in the crossfire between the United States and the EU over
Genetically Modified food,"'"8 African countries simultaneously have specific
views on the subject and an agenda of their own concerning their position in
the international agricultural trade arena. Various African countries1 7 have
been forced into the middle of this debate because of their limited ability to
compete with developed countries' quality and quantity of agricultural
production.' Furthermore, the hunger epidemic throughout Africa, which
African countries have thus far been unable to resolve on their own, might be
solved if U.S. food aid currently being offered were to be accepted.8 9 Those
individuals starving throughout the developing regions of Africa seem
reluctant to refuse the offered aid, but those opposed to GMO technology fear
that accepting the assistance might ultimately prove to be at too great a cost.
While the GMO crisis is global in scope, "it is a common view that developing
countries, especially in Africa, cannot afford to reject GM-crops while food
shortages and crop failures remain prevalent. " "
116 Izama Angelo et al., Africa's Dilemma in GeneticallyModified Food War, MONITOR, May
29, 2003, http://www.biotech-info.net/africas-dilemma.html (last visited Nov. 8, 2003)
(identifying developing countries' placement between those developed countries engaging in this
soon-to-be international trade war).
"8 African countries that remain in the middle of this conflict based upon their inability to
produce sufficient amounts of food to eradicate the existing hunger epidemic include Zimbabwe,
Zambia, Malawi, Lesotho, Swaziland and Mozambique. See Judy Aita, World Food Program
Says African Food Crisis Threatens 38 Million, WASH. FILE OFFICE OF INT'L INR) PROGRAMS,
U.S. DEP'T OFSTATE, Dec. 3,2002, available at http://www.useu.be/Categories/Sustainable%20
DevelopmentIDec03O2WFPAfricaFamine.html (last visited Nov. 11, 2003).
18 World Trade Organization, Agriculture Negotiations: Backgrounder Phase): Developing
Countries, at http://www.wto.org/english/tratop-e/agric-e/negs-bkgrndO9_develop-e.htm (last
visited Nov. 11, 2003).
119 "The United States has pledged $266 million worth of food to southern Africa this year
as well as more than $10 million worth of non-food aid needed for regional management and
logistics, agriculture, therapeutic feeding, emergency health needs and cholera response and
prevention." Aita, supra note 187.
190 Stephanie G. Burton & Don A. Cowan, Development of Biotechnology in South Africa,
5 ELEcrRoNicJ. OF BIOTECHNOLOGY (2002), at http://www.ejbiotechnology.info/content/vol5/
issue I/issues/03/.
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1. Africa and International Trade Law
While most legal discussion on the debate surrounding open international
trade of GMOs focuses on the existing U.S.-EU conflict, the region most
affected by potential implementation of international GMO regulations may
well be those developing countries that lack the authority to effectively contest
such policies. Existing WTO regulations included in the SPS Agreement
appear inadequate for developing countries that have little recourse against the
placement of genetically modified products into their markets by developed
nations like the United States.191 Furthermore, trade restrictions imposed in
accordance with other multilateral agreements, including the Biosafety
Protocol, threaten to push developing countries like those of Africa, whose
domestic agricultural markets remain behind developed countries in the world
market, out of the agricultural trade arena altogether.'92
WTO agreements like the SPS provide those opposed to strong GMO
regulation with some means to bypass them. 93 "GMO exporters are using the
WTO system to get the international trading rules that will maximise their
profit and minimise the possibility of government intervention."' 94 Further-
more, GMO proponents (namely the United States) have "threatened to use
existing WTO agreements to undermine calls by developing countries for
strong rules on GMOs." 95 Traditionally, the WTO accorded special treatment
to developing countries in the form of reduced standards on certain agricultural
products.' The potential risks posed by GMOs, however, indicate that
compliance with elevated international standards must be achieved by all GM
food producers.' 97 Even if the WTO agreements allow developing countries
"I' See Martin Khor, TWN Africa, NAM Summit Proposes Economic and WTO Reforms, Feb.
26,2003, at http://www.twnafrica.org/news-detail.asptwnlD=294 (last visited Nov. 11,2003)
(discussing the "imbalance and asymmetries that have been apparent in the course of
implementation of the WTO Agreements").
" See generally id. (citing concern over the "lack of market access for products of special
interest to developing countries, non-realisation of the provisions for special and differential
treatment, and the curtailment of developing countries' ability to pursue policy instruments and
promote development").
"9 See World Development Movement, GMOs and the WTO: Overruling the right to say no
(Nov. 1999), at http://www.wdm.org.uk/cambriefs/gmos/GMOs-WTO.htm (last visited Nov.
11,2003).
194 Id.
195 Id.
'96 See id.
197 See id.
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to stray from labeling and testing requirements currently being suggested, the
Biosafety Protocol would permit developed countries to restrict imports of
those products not meeting uniform international standards.19 With two
conflicting bodies of law providing guidance, uncertainty abounds as to
whether the existing WTO trade agreements are reconcilable with the
Biosafety Protocol.
Prior to 1994, the WTO permitted certain member states S&D Treatment
intended to "accord developing countries special rights to nurture infant
industries, preferential access to developed-country markets and non-
reciprocity in trade negotiations."' 99 Following the Uruguay Round in 1994,
"member governments adopted the 'single undertaking' approach that required
both developed and developing countries to adhere to nearly the same set of
agreements on trade rules. ' 2" Although WTO members were urged to provide
assistance to developing countries implementing SPS following the 1994
Uruguay Round, it seems little has come of the suggestion.2"' For example, in
the highly specialized area covered by the TBT Agreement, "little effort has
been made to implement the commitment to help developing countries tackle
the special difficulties they face in the formulation and application of
standards."' 2 With ineffective assistance provided to developing countries by
the various WTO agreements, the Biosafety Protocol's potential treatment of
developing nations becomes an important consideration.
2. Africa and the Biosafety Protocol
"The [Biosafety Protocol] represents an example... of the highly complex
nature of the legal disputes occurring at the interface between free trade and
environmental protection. ,203 Implementation of the Protocol on a national
198 Id.
'" Kiichiro Fukasaku, UNU World Inst. for Dev. Econ. Research, Special and Differential
Treatment for Developing Countries: Does It Help Those Who Help Themselves, 1 (Sept. 2000),
at http://www.wider.unu.edu/publications/wpl97.pdf (last visited Nov. 11, 2003) (stating that
"[t]he principle of non-reciprocity legitimized 'free-riding' on the part of developing countries
and allowed them to opt out of MFN-based liberalization commitments" in trade negotiations).
2W0I&
"I Peter M. Gerhart, Slow Transformations: The WTO as a Distributive Organization, 17
AM. U. IN'L L. REv. 1045, n.88 (2002).
o Peter Lichtenbaum, "Special Treatment" vs. "Equal Participation ": Striking a Balance
in the Doha Negotiations, 17 AM. U. INT'LL. REv. 1003, 1019-20 (2002).
203 Grant E. Isaac et al., International Regulation of Trade in the Products of Biotechnology:
Executive Summary, 9, Estey Centre for Law and Economics in International Trade (Nov. 2001),
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level "may prove difficult for many Parties, particularly developing countries,
which typically lack trained personnel, technology, and the infrastructure
necessary for complex regulatory regimes. The Protocol does, however,
impose obligations upon the Parties to provide financial and other capacity
building assistance." 2'
The Protocol entered into force internationally on September 11, 2003
(although it still lacks the force of international law retained by the WTO
Agreements)."° Many believe, however, that along with the recent ratification
of the Protocol will come a great deal of pressure placed upon those currently
engaged in international trade to ensure compliance with this new
Agreement.' Drafted in an era of scientific advancement, many speculate that
the Protocol will prove more successful than its predecessor WTO agreements
in providing the necessary assistance that developing countries currently lack
and greatly need.2' 7
One feature included in the Protocol that is considered tremendously
beneficial for developing countries is the much heralded Precautionary
Principle, which allows a country to place protective restrictions on GM
products absent specific scientific data supporting any danger."' 8 Although
"many European and developing countries wanted the pact to supercede World
Trade Organisation (WTO) rules," the United States and other GMO
proponents argued that allowing the Protocol to override WTO agreements
might permit protectionist restrictions on trade.' Importantly, the WTO will
be required to attempt some level of reconciliation between the Biosafety
Protocol and its own science-based rules when resolving disputes over import
restrictions. ° Even consideration of the Protocol by the WTO Dispute Panel,however, does not guarantee that future decisions made by the organization
at http://www.esteycentre.calregoftrade.doc.
Paul E. Hagen & John Barlow Weiner, The Cartagena Protocol on Biosafety: New Rules
for International Trade in Living Modified Organisms, 12 GEO. INT'LENvTL L. REV. 697, 715
(2000).
See Cartagena Protocol, supra note 151.
See generally AGRICULTURAL BIOTECHNOLOGY SUPPORT PRoJECT, Biotechnology &
International Agreements (discussing the "pressure of compliance with these international
agreements..."), at http://www.iia.msu.edu/absp/biotech-int.html (last visited Jan. 27, 2004).
' See Sustainable Development International, Biosafety Protocol Signed by 63 Nations, at
http://www.sustdev.orglindustry.news/052000/0238.shtml (last visited Nov. 13, 2003).
20o See Protocol Watered Down, supra note 30.
209 id.
210 id.
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responsible for regulating international trade will fairly consider non-scientific
evidence, essentially favoring protection of human health and the environment.
3. Domestic and International Implications for Africa
In Africa, both "ethical and metaphysical ideas have, over the ages, been
shaped and coloured by its ecological, biological and cultural diversity."2' In
addition to the ethical concerns that abound, economic constraints in Africa
continue to halt the progress of biotechnology in Africa's agricultural arena."'
"[D]espite the importance of its share in GDP and its share in the total labour
force, the agricultural sector has in many countries [in Africa] been overlooked
as the major focus in economic development and has suffered from
underinvestment."
21 3
Even among the various African countries, the possibility for internal
conflict appears likely. Africa's desire to strengthen its position on the
international trade market as an agricultural exporter may be irreconcilable
with the desire to protect citizens who fear the long-term repercussions of
internal use of GM products. In addition, the ongoing hunger epidemic that
remains unresolved by Africa' s own agricultural production is likely to worsen
if immediate action, such as acceptance of GM food aid from the United
States, is not taken.
Even while taking a stand regarding labeling and indicating their desire for
superior-quality food imports, several countries in Africa" 4 have begun to
participate in agricultural genetic engineering and are actively researching,
developing, and producing GM foods themselves.2 5 Those African countries
can be divided into three distinct groups based on their level of production.
They are (1) countries that use genetic engineering to generate products
ultimately placed into the open market for international trade (Egypt, South
21' Darryl Macer, Bioethics, BIOTECHNOLOGY AND DEVELOPMENT MONITOR, No. 32, Sept.
1997, at 25, http://www.biotech-monitor.ni/3202.htm.
212 Carliene Brenner, Agricultural Biotechnology R&D in Africa: Structural Constraints,
African Centre for Technology Studies (Sept. 27-29, 1999), at http://www.acts.or.ke/Biotech%
20-%20BRENNER.pdf (last visited Nov. 13, 2003).
213 Id.
214 Countries currently engaging in various levels of biotechnology include Egypt, South
Africa, Zimbabwe, Ghana, Kenya, Uganda, and Tanzania. See P. Kameri-Mbote, Biotechnology
and Food Security in Africa: Some Policy and Institutional Considerations, International
Environmental Law Research Centre, IELRC Briefing Paper 2002-4, at http://www.ielrc.orgt
Content/BP02041T.html (last visited Nov. 13, 2003).
215 Id.
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Africa, and Zimbabwe), (2) countries engaging only in biotechnology research
and development but not production (Ghana, Kenya, and Uganda), and (3)
counties engaged in minimal biotechnology activities such as tissue culture
(Tanzania and Uganda).21
Although some regions of Africa are independently involved in the
production of genetically engineered food products, a complaint has been made
that may be the underlying reason for Africa's newfound desire for independ-
ence from biotechnology. It has been said that "[t]he globalization of the
world economy and the emergence of the giant transnational corporations
(with economic potential greater than that of a group of developing countries
put together) are shaping the development of countries in Africa and elsewhere
in the developing world."2"7 Fearing a loss of agricultural control, Africa's
recent position supporting the EU proposition that adheres to strict labeling
and control appears more justified.
In the absence of a ratified Biosafety Protocol, African countries recently
began passing their own domestic legislation to regulate genetically engineered
products. 218 In 1997, South Africa's Parliament passed the Genetically
Modified Organisms Act,2"9 which has been heralded by some as legislation
surpassing the Biosafety Protocol with regard to the issues it addresses.220
Through their domestic legislation and the position they have taken refusing
food aid, many African countries remain concerned about (1) increasing EU
resistance to importation of GMO's, (2) developing countries being abused by
biotech companies looking for new testing ground for their GM products, (3)
risks to the African population following long-term consumption, (4) ethical
issues raised by religious beliefs that restrict the use of animal genes in
modified agricultural products, and (5) the general harms that may result in
both humans and the environment after exposure to genetically manipulated
products. 221
216 Id.
217 Id.
218 Id.
239 Genetically Modified Organisms Act, Minister for Agriculture and Land Affairs, at http://
www.gautengleg.gov.za/ (last visited Nov. 26, 2003) (S. Aft.).
22 THIRD WORLD NETwORK, The long, winding road to a Biosafety Protocol--a South
African view, at http://www.twnside.org.sg/title/mariam-cn.htm (last visited Nov. 13, 2003).
221 Id.
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C. WTO Versus the Biosafety Protocol: Is Resolution in Africa Feasible?
Perhaps the most important aspect of this analysis is the potential for
reconciliation of existing WTO agreements and the Biosafety Protocol.
Legally, there are significant differences between the goals promoted by the
WTO and those cited by the Biosafety Protocol, leaving open the door for an
abundance of conflict between the two.222 Within the confines of international
law, there is no fundamental principle that indicates "which regime would
prevail in the event of a conflict." '223 Although trade restrictions exist within
other Multilateral Environmental Agreements (MEAs)224 often conflict with
the free-trade goals of the WTO, none of them have yet been formally
challenged. Some fear, however, that WTO members will not continue to
"tolerate the incompatibility of the BSP [Biosafety Protocol] due to the
significant institutional differences that exist" between the two.225 If a conflict
is ultimately brought before the WTO and involves its member states, it is
unlikely that the Biosafety Protocol would hold significant weight in any WTO
decision.
Significant differences between the Biosafety Protocol and other MEAs
that conflict with the WTO could cause some to wonder how a GMO dispute
brought before the WTO might be resolved. The most obvious and fundamen-
tal differences include such things as the Protocol's (1) lacking "popular
support accorded to other incompatible MEAs," (2) remaining unsigned by the
U.S., which dominates the world biotechnology market as its largest producer
and consumer, and (3) being ratified primarily by those countries that are
largely insignificant producers and consumers of GM products.226 Though the
WTO may be willing to "accept certain trade-distorting measures in limited
circumstances, their preference is clearly for multilaterally agreed
222 Isaac et al., supra note 203.
223 Id. at 9.
224 Id. (discussing that
[t]o date, none of these MEAs has been challenged at the WTO. It appears
that the basis for tolerating this ongoing incompatibility stems from the
popular support for the MEAs (the Basel Convention has been ratified by 148
countries and 180 countries have signed the Montreal Protocol) and from the
unwillingness of countries to force a choice between trade and the environ-
ment under international law).
Id
225 Id.
226 Id.
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standards. 227 It seems unlikely, therefore, that the WTO will entertain
resolutions that have long-term potential of hindering free trade.
D. Solutions and Alternatives
Today, more than 100 WTO members are considered developing
countries.2 8 'Their development concerns thus must be adequately taken into
account in the global trade rules." '229 Though heavily contested by the United
States, trade restrictions on GMOs and heightened requirements concerning
scientific testing and clear labeling seem a certain part of the future. In the
past, the WTO's ultimate objective to promote free international trade has
allowed it to give preferential treatment to developing countries that lacked the
resources necessary to remain competitive on the world market. There now
needs to be some attempt by those governing international trade laws to merge
the varying interests of those on opposite sides of this debate.
If the WTO looked in the direction of Cartagena, it might discover that the
Biosafety Protocol, which builds in an abundance of protective mechanisms
in light of scientific uncertainty, also appears to suggest potential ways to bring
developing countries onto a level playing field in international trade. By
requiring member states to provide assistance in one form or another, the
Biosafety Protocol more effectively guarantees developing countries will be
included in ongoing international trade. Rather than allowing developing
countries like those in Africa to skirt the GM product requirements because
they cannot afford to comply, the WTO would be much better regarded if it
called for developed members to assist developing countries by providing the
means that would ensure ongoing compliance with health and safety standards.
VI. CONCLUSION
For decades, trade barriers have been used in the name of human health and
environmental safety.23 While some discriminatory trade measures may be
justified under the environmental exceptions of GATT, narrow interpretation
by the WTO leaves significant doubt regarding the outcome should a dispute
227 Id. at 10.
228 Fukasaku, supra note 199, at 1.
29 Id.
"' Stephanie Carlston, The World Trade Organization Millenium Conference in Seattle: The
WTO Recognizes a Relationship Between Trade and the Environment and Its Effect on
Developing Countries, 1999 COLO. J. INT'L ENvTL L. 33).
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officially be brought before the WTO. The ongoing need for some means to
regulate international trade has been compounded by recent advancements in
biotechnology, which include the highly disputed creation and trade of
genetically modified foods. In response to GM food products being placed on
the international market, many WTO members have begun placing trade
restrictions on genetically modified organisms.23" ' With scientific advance-
ments that have yielded GM food products comes uncertainty about possible
long-term implications to both human health and environmental safety.
Propelled by proponents who hail the abundance of benefits as a solution
to many problems, especially with the famine problem felt by many developing
countries, the United States has gained a competitive edge over other
developed countries in the arenas of genetic engineering and biotechnology.232
Select developed countries, including members of the EU, however, remain
fearful of the unknown repercussions of playing God with nature. Until now,
this explosive international conflict has remained unresolved by any body
governing international trade law.233 Likely fearful of the possible outcome,
no developed country has yet formally approached the WTO with any specific
complaints over the trade restrictions currently being placed upon genetically
modified products. Until recently, it was believed by many that this ongoing
dispute over international trade remained limited to developed countries, with
a specific focus on the conflict that has developed between the United States
and the EU. Recently, however, this GMO debate has begun to involve an
entirely unexpected group-developing countries--causing the debate to take
a sudden and dramatic turn.
Stranded in the middle of this conflict over GMO technology and food
products are those developing countries that struggle for inclusion in the
international agricultural trade arena. Lacking the resources to comply with
many of the trade restrictions being imposed, countries like those within Africa
have been left with limited alternatives for market participation. Most
recently, some African countries have been forced to choose whether to accept
food aid that has undergone genetic engineering from the United States, or give
up the aid to ensure future trade prospects with the EU. 34 As this debate over
GMO technology continues to rage between those proponents who seek an end
' See Kupchella, supra note 7.
232 See Bob Swientek, GMOs and HMOs (Jan. 2000), at http://www.preparedfoods.com/
archives/2000/2000_01/0001.toc.htm (last visited Nov. 13, 2003).
23' See id.
n See id.
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to famine in various African countries and the opponents who consider the
possible havoc that may be wrought upon their ecosystems, the decisions over
whether to accept this controversial food becomes more difficult."3 5
Looking to international trade law and its primary governing organization,
existing protections provided to developing African countries appear
inadequate. Existing WTO agreements, which include GATT, the SPS, and
the TBT, have not yet been able to effectively assist developing countries in
adapting to the elevated trade standards required by developed nations.236
Intended to provide guidelines on genetically engineered products, the SPS
required certain scientific standards while the TBT guaranteed testing and
labeling for all genetically altered products. 237 Neither agreement, however,
provides any means by which developing countries could achieve these lofty
and expensive goals.238 Where WTO agreements failed to provide effective
guidance to developing countries attempting to maintain a position in
international agricultural trade, the Biosafety Protocol was born.
Although it deals more specifically with protecting countries from possible
biotechnological harm, the Biosafety Protocol might provide the WTO with
guidelines for potential mechanisms to regulate its developing members. In
addition to the requirement that its developed members provide assistance to
those that are not developed, the Biosafety Protocol includes the precautionary
principle, which allows countries to implement trade barriers in the absence of
the scientific proof of harm that the WTO often requires.2 39 However, some
fear that developing countries may need more than mere economic assistance
as they lack the training, technology, and foundation necessary to be successful
in this new area of international trade.'
" See A. Bennett, GM technologies-opportunities and threats of applying GM technology
in less developed and developed countries, at http://www.bsas.org.uk/meetings/annlproc/
Pdf2003/212.pdf (last visited Nov. 13, 2003) (discussing the theory that "costs of getting GM
technologies into the market place are already higher than more traditional technologies; for
many developing countries these costs and capacities needed are beyond their means").
236 See Mustafizur Rahman, Market Access Implications of SPS and TBTAgreements, Centre
for Policy Dialogue, available at http://cuts.org/sps-analysis-marketaccess.htm (last visited Nov.
13, 2003).
23 See Appleton, supra note 115, at 572.
238 See id.
239 Hagen & Weiner, supra note 204, at 714.
24 Press Release 01/31, Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations, FAO
Director-General Stresses Benefits of Biotechnology in Fighting Hunger and Malnutrition and
Calls for Open Debate on Potential Risks (May 14, 2001) (discussing the need among
developing countries for assistance in (1) learning how to properly implement field testing of
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Even if the WTO looks to the Biosafety Protocol for guidance, existing
WTO Agreements and the Protocol may not be fully reconcilable in the event
an international trade dispute ultimately emerges. Significant legal differences
create a great potential for conflict, and neither regime can be labeled a clear
winner.2" In its current form, the Biosafety Protocol might be helpful if
considered by the WTO in the event of a trade dispute.242 Since the WTO is
under no obligation to follow the guidelines set out in the Protocol, it seems
unlikely that it would entertain the incompatible doctrine.243 Even if a dispute
brought before the WTO were to be considered in light of the Biosafety
Protocol, many environmentalists remain concerned that any WTO decision
would ultimately weigh most heavily in favor of free trade.
With more than 100 WTO members currently classified as developing
countries, existing trade rules must be adjusted to account for potential
differential treatment in the name of genetic engineering.244 While the United
States disagrees, public opinion throughout the world remains largely in favor
of ongoing scientific testing and possible labeling of genetically modified
products. International laws govern trade, but consumers truly control the
international trade market. With ongoing scientific discovery and inevitable
advancement sure to continue, it seems clear that this debate has no clear end
in sight. In the meantime, the WTO would be wise to consider the environ-
mental concerns upheld by those currently standing in full opposition to
genetic engineering and food alteration. Attempting to reconcile the goals of
international trade with potential human and environmental risks, therefore,
remains both prudent and necessary if developing countries caught in the
middle of this conflict are to receive any effective assistance in this fight.
GM crops, and (2) researching policy and management issues relating to biotechnology and
genetic engineering) (on file with the author).
241 See Tom Ato, Biosafety and Genetic Engineering-49 countries ratify Cartagena
Biosafety Protocol (May 28,2003), at http://portland.indymedia.org/en/2003/05/265512.shtml
(last visited Jan. 27, 2004) (identifying the Biosafety Protocol's direct conflict with existing
WTO rules, which permit import restrictions only when clear scientific evidence of potential
human or environmental harm exists).
2 See Isaac et al., supra note 203, at 9.
243 See id. at 9.
24 See Fukasaku, supra note 199, at 1-2.
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